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Perhaps sensing a rising tide of disapproval
amongAmericans,theU.S.Congresshasresponded
with a number of measures leaning toward eco-
nomic isolation. In its first three months, the 110th
Congress introduced more than a dozen pieces
of legislation restricting trade with China
(Aldonas et al., 2007). Since April of this year,
both the House of Representatives and the
Senate have convened numerous hearings to
examine the economic implications of trade, espe-
cially as it relates to China.1 Congress has also
failed to renew the policy of trade promotion
authority, also known as fast-track authority,
which permits the president to negotiate trade
agreements that the Congress can either approve
or reject, but not amend. That authority expired
on July 1 of this year.
My purpose today is to review some of the
ideas surrounding the debate over trade and the
labor market and provide an evaluation in light
of the recent evidence on the performance of the
U.S. economy.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments, especially Christopher H. Wheeler,
research officer, who provided special assistance.
However, I retain full responsibility for errors.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The basic principle underlying international
trade is this: When countries specialize in the
I
nternational trade has long been a divisive
issue, both in the United States and in
other countries around the world. While
many, including the vast majority of econ-
omists, support free trade on the ground that it
improves an economy’s overall well-being, those
who disagree hold that it accomplishes precisely
the opposite: On this opposing view, trade
destroys jobs and lowers wages, especially among
the most vulnerable members of society. On its
face, the job destruction issue cannot be correct
for the U.S. economy, which has clearly gener-
ated jobs to replace those lost because of imports.
The U.S. economy is fully employed, with an
unemployment rate below 5 percent.
Recent evidence suggests that the job destruc-
tion view is held by a substantial number of peo-
ple. A poll taken at the end of last year by the Pew
Research Center for the People and the Press
found that, among Americans, 48 percent believed
that free-trade agreements led to job losses in the
United States, while only 12 percent thought that
free-trade agreements created jobs. The poll also
found that 44 percent of respondents believe that
free trade lowers wages for American workers,
while 11 percent believe it raises wages (Pew
Research Center for the People and the Press,
2006). A Financial Times-Harris poll released in
July of this year found similar opinions among
many Europeans. More than 50 percent of those
polled in Great Britain, France, Italy and Spain
felt that globalization has had a negative effect
on their countries. Less than a third responded
that globalization has had a positive effect.
1 The U.S. Senate held a hearing entitled “Is ‘Free Trade’ Working?” on April 18, 2007 and “U.S. Trade Relations with China” on July 25, 2007.
The House held a “Hearing on Legislation Related to Trade with China” on Aug. 2, 2007.production of the goods and services they pro-
duce particularly well and trade for those they
produce relatively less efficiently, all countries
can be made better off, at least in aggregate.
Interestingly, while most find the idea of com-
parative advantage and gains from trade obvious
in the case of individuals—we are, after all, much
better off specializing and trading than we would
be if we had to produce everything for ourselves—
many remain skeptical of trade’s benefits for
countries. This basic principle, however, applies
to nations just as it does to individual households
as producers and consumers.
Consumers and workers also stand to gain
from trade through increased competition. Recent
research has demonstrated that, by increasing
competition among producers, trade forces an
economy’s inefficient firms out of the market,
thus spurring a reallocation of labor from less-
productive to more-productive employers
(Bernard et al., 2007). Evidence of this produc-
tivity effect is also apparent in cross-country
studies that find that economic growth is strongly
tied to openness to trade (Edwards, 1998).
Trade theory also asserts, however, that within
any given country, the gains from trade may be
unevenly distributed. To be sure, the vast major-
ity of individuals undoubtedly gain for the reasons
I have just described. Yet, there will be some
workers who experience labor market disrup-
tions as their jobs are eliminated due to rising
imports or the offshoring of production facilities.
These individuals clearly suffer, and their losses
in terms of job opportunities, income and morale
can be both substantial and long-lived.
For developed, capital-abundant countries
like the United States and the United Kingdom,
standard trade theory suggests that trade with
the developing world will have its greatest nega-
tive effect on the less-skilled because developing
economies such as China and India are relatively
abundant in that type of labor. The United States,
for example, imports large quantities of apparel,
furniture and toys from China, while exporting
significant quantities of civilian aircraft and
semi-conductors (U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign
Trade Statistics). One of the possible labor market
outcomes of trade liberalization, then, is a widen-
ing of the earnings distribution in the developed
world. Many are rightly concerned about this
possibility. Within recent decades, both the
United States and Great Britain have seen the
extent of inequality in their wage distributions
increase sharply.
Formal trade theory does not, however,
posit what so many in the world’s developed
economies seem to believe: that trade leads to
net job losses and lower average wages. This con-
cern has long been raised with imports, but it has
been magnified by the perceived rise in recent
years of offshore production, which Thomas
Friedman describes with so many compelling
anecdotes in his recent book, The World Is Flat.
Some of the most recent concerns, in fact, hold
that the developed world’s high-wage jobs, such
as those in business services, are now at risk of
being shipped overseas.
Are trade and offshoring destroying American
jobs and reducing wages in the United States?
Let me begin with a brief overview of the state of
the U.S. labor market.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
U.S. LABOR MARKET
Overall, most indicators suggest that the U.S.
labor market is strong. Following a period of
sluggish growth between June 2000 and August
2003, a period that saw payroll employment in
the United States fall by more than 2 million, the
U.S. economy has since created, on average,
167,000 net new jobs per month. This figure
translates into an average growth rate in the num-
ber of non-farm jobs in the U.S. of approximately
1.6 percent per year, which is not substantially
different from the average sustained during the
second half of the twentieth century. The current
unemployment rate is below 5 percent, compared
to an average of 6 percent over the past quarter
century.
Just looking at 2007, the numbers have not
been quite as robust, but they are far from slow.
Between January and July of this year, the U.S.
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132,000 jobs per month, or about 1.2 percent at
an annual rate. Given that the unemployment
rate has hovered around 4.5 percent since January,
and has remained below 5 percent for much of
the last two years, the economy seems to be oper-
ating near full employment. Rather than being a
sign of a weakening economy, the recent slow-
down in the rate of job creation is almost certainly
related to a slowing of labor force growth as the
baby-boom generation reaches retirement age.
Recent figures on earnings are also positive.
Within the last 12 months, average hourly earn-
ings in the private, non-farm sector have increased
by nearly 4 percent in nominal terms and 1.7
percent after accounting for inflation. This devel-
opment is particularly encouraging following a
four-year period in which average real hourly
compensation showed essentially no growth.
EVIDENCE ON TRADE AND JOB
GROWTH
The evidence clearly points to a largely favor-
able labor market. Given that, over the past four
years, U.S. trade volumes have steadily increased,
with the sum of imports and exports rising from
24.7 percent of GDP in the third quarter of 2003
to 29 percent in the second quarter of this year,
the data do not support the claim that trade is
destroying American jobs. More precisely, U.S.
employment is high, despite significant job
losses in industries impacted by imports. Employ-
ment security is high, even though job security
in industries affected by imports is not. In a
strong aggregate job market, displaced workers
soon find new jobs.
A casual reading of the evidence indicates
that the business cycle is far more important
than trade in determining the rate at which the
U.S. labor market is gaining or losing jobs. To
examine trends in both international trade and
U.S. employment growth since 1995, consider
three periods: (i) 1995 to 1999, (ii) 2000 to 2003,
and (iii) 2004 to the present. The first and third
periods are meant to represent times when both
the U.S. labor market and the economy as a
whole were expanding. The middle period, of
course, reflects the recession and sluggish job
market following the recession.
One of the most salient features of the data
from these three periods is the strong positive
association between the rate of job growth and
the rate of import growth. The highest rates were
seen during the latter half of the 1990s, when
employment growth averaged 241,000 jobs per
month, an annual rate of 2.4 percent, and the
real value of imports of goods and services grew
at an average annual rate of 10.4 percent. Since
January of 2004, those rates have been somewhat
slower, with the labor market creating 182,000
jobs per month and imports rising at an average
annual rate of 7.2 percent.
Compare these figures with those from our
period of slow growth. Between 2000 and 2003,
the U.S. economy lost 5,000 jobs per month, on
average, and imports expanded at an annual rate
of 4.4 percent. Such evidence, I contend, provides
little support to the notion that rising imports
have come at the expense of U.S. jobs.
Additional evidence, based on more detailed
empirical analyses, demonstrates a similar point.
A 2004 study by Martin Baily and Robert Lawrence
finds that, while the U.S. was losing many manu-
facturing jobs between 2000 and 2003, the share
of imports in U.S. domestic spending on goods
actually decreased from 31.8 percent to 31.4 per-
cent (Baily and Lawrence, 2004).
A study by economists at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York finds that data on gross job
destruction show little evidence that rising trade
lowers U.S. employment. Although the rate of
job destruction increased during the 2001 reces-
sion, just as it typically does during economic
downturns, that rate has since fallen to levels
below those sustained during the rapidly expand-
ing labor market of the 1990s (Groshen et al.,
2005).
None of these findings is intended to imply
that trade and offshore production have not had
any negative influence on U.S. employment. The
same New York Fed study estimates that, over
the past two decades, job losses from the increas-
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amounted to as much as 2.4 percent of total U.S.
employment in the year 2003, when the labor
market was near its most recent bottom (Groshen
et al., 2005). This estimate, of course, is based
purely on a simple calculation of how many
American jobs are represented by the U.S. net
export balance in goods and services. As the
authors of that study stress, looking at the esti-
mated job loss by itself does not account for any
of the likely benefits of trade, such as improved
efficiency and higher real incomes for U.S.
workers, both of which may boost domestic
employment. In spite of this omission, their num-
bers still suggest that trade-related job destruction
is minor in the context of the total U.S. labor
market.
Some may still argue that the business cycle
does not fully account for the loss of manufac-
turing employment. After all, even though U.S.
employment has increased by nearly 2 million
over the past year, the economy has lost 175,000
manufacturing jobs. Is it possible that trade and
offshoring have caused these losses?
A recent paper by the economist Ed Leamer
(Leamer, 2007) suggests that the answer is largely
“no.” To arrive at this conclusion, Leamer com-
pares changes in domestic demand for goods to
the domestic growth of productivity and the rise
of manufacturing imports in order to explain
changes in U.S. manufacturing employment. All
else held constant, a rise in domestic demand
should increase employment, whereas rising
productivity growth and imports should both
decrease it. Between 1970 and 2005, the produc-
tivity effect on durable manufacturing employ-
ment was roughly 11 times larger than the effect
associated with rising imports. In the non-durables
sector, the ratio was even larger: The estimated
productivity effect on employment was 30 times
that of the effect from trade. The loss of manu-
facturing jobs, which has been occurring in the
United States for decades, seems to have its roots
in the growth of productivity rather than in the
rise of imports.
Is there any evidence that trade has harmed
U.S. workers by destroying high-paying jobs?
That is, as trade volumes have increased, have
we seen the distribution of jobs shift toward lower
paying positions? If we look at some recent figures
describing the growth of jobs within certain indus-
tries and occupations in the United States, we
find little support for this contention. Since 2004,
the fastest growing broad occupational category,
both in percentage terms as well as absolute num-
ber of jobs, was business and financial operations,
which includes accountants, auditors and finan-
cial analysts. This occupation grew by more than
13 percent between May 2004 and 2006, adding
nearly 700,000 jobs. Sizable job gains were also
registered in computer and mathematical science
occupations; healthcare practitioners; education
training and library service; life, physical, and
social sciences; and legal services, which collec-
tively added nearly 1 million jobs over this same
period. Median hourly earnings in each of these
occupational groups exceed the overall U.S.
median. Evidently, in a time of rising interna-
tional trade, there has been strong employment
growth at the upper end of the pay scale.
Certain low-wage jobs have also shown
growth. The number of jobs in food preparation,
such as cooks and waiters, as well as those in
sales, which includes cashiers and other retail
establishment employees, expanded by more
than 1.1 million between 2004 and 2006. Median
earnings in these sectors of the American econ-
omy are below the national median. Of course,
the growth of these types of jobs may be related
to the overall strength of the U.S. economy. Indeed,
the extent to which retail establishments and
restaurants are able to expand their payrolls
likely depends directly on overall personal
income growth. One of the reasons we have seen
growth in low-wage sectors, then, may be the
strong growth of jobs in high-wage sectors.
Data covering industries over the past 12
months demonstrate a similar pattern. Since
July of last year, the U.S. economy has added
nearly 1.9 million jobs, with the largest gains
coming in two high-wage sectors—education
and health services, and professional and busi-
ness services—and one low-wage sector—leisure
and hospitality. Together, these three industries
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over the 12 months ending July 2007.
EVIDENCE ON TRADE,
PRODUCTIVITY, AND WAGES
While job growth is clearly a fundamental
measure of labor-market performance, many
economists would underscore the growth of pro-
ductivity as an even stronger gauge of an econ-
omy’s well-being. Indeed, it is largely through
productivity growth—the rise in the quantity of
output produced per unit of input used—that
incomes and living standards improve over time.
Trade turns out to be a significant driver of
productivity growth. In part, this connection is
the result of the fact that developed nations like
the United States import goods produced by rel-
atively low-productivity sectors, such as apparel,
textiles and furniture, and export goods and serv-
ices in relatively high-productivity sectors, includ-
ing professional and business services and aircraft.
This pattern leads to a reallocation of labor from
low- to high-productivity work as employment
decreases in industries comparatively disadvan-
taged and expands in industries comparatively
advantaged. Evidence of this process is apparent
in both the employment trends I have already
discussed, especially the growth of professional
and business service employment, as well as from
research on plant-level dynamics. A recent study
has shown that, as industries in the United States
have seen greater import penetration from less
developed economies, producers within those
industries are more likely to switch to the pro-
duction of more capital-intensive products. That
is, they exit low-productivity sectors and enter
high-productivity ones (Bernard et al., 2006).
The reallocation of labor from low- to high-
productivity firms also takes place within indus-
tries. Thus, even though rising imports may
produce employment losses within an industry,
say primary or fabricated metals, workers in that
sector tend, over time, to become concentrated
among the most productive producers.
This process has been particularly striking
among exporters. Although the vast majority of
the firms engaged in export activity in the United
States tend to be small in terms of total employ-
ment, more than 70 percent of the value of U.S.
exports to the rest of the world is accounted for
by relatively large ventures, namely those with
more than 500 employees (U.S. Census Bureau,
2007). These large firms tend to be characterized
by significant capital intensity and high levels of
productivity and pay higher wages, on average,
than their smaller counterparts. The dominant
position of these large producers has developed
over time as a direct result of the reallocation of
resources from less-efficient organizations to
more-efficient ones. Moreover, estimates suggest
that this process has delivered enormous produc-
tivity benefits to the U.S. economy. A recent
study has estimated that productive reallocation
may account for as much as 40 percent of the
growth in total factor productivity among U.S.
manufacturers during the 1980s and early 1990s
(Bernard and Jensen, 2004).
POLICIES TO ADDRESS TRADE’S
LOSERS
Although their numbers are relatively small
compared to the size of the U.S. economy, many
workers have been displaced by trade. Estimates
suggest that, between 2000 and 2003, as many as
300,000 service jobs (Garner, 2004) and another
314,000 manufacturing jobs (Baily and Lawrence,
2004) may have been lost due to trade. These
individuals, in many instances, experience sig-
nificant losses. Studies have shown, for example,
that re-employment rates tend to be lower among
workers displaced by trade than those who are
unemployed for other reasons (Kletzer, 2005).
Studies also show that, among those who do
eventually find new jobs, about two-thirds earn
less on their new job than on the job they lost
(Kletzer, 2005).
Rather than place further limitations on
trade, which would surely hamper economic
growth, policymakers should make sure that
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assistance they need in order to find new work.
The United States enacted its Trade Adjustment
Assistance program in 1962 to offer workers who
have been displaced by trade both income assis-
tance and training in an effort to help them make
the transition to a new line of work. Certain
workers may, instead, opt for Alternative Trade
Adjustment Assistance, which provides wage
insurance for workers who move on to jobs that
pay less than what they had received before being
displaced. The United States also has two addi-
tional programs aimed at helping unemployed
workers find jobs: unemployment insurance (UI),
which provides income support, and the Work-
force Investment Act, which helps workers pay
for training.
Such programs are certainly constructive,
but more could probably be done to assist those
who have lost a job. Trade Adjustment Assistance
currently covers workers who lose jobs due to
imports of goods, but offers no coverage for
workers displaced by imports of services. Given
that the majority of the American workforce is
employed in services, and recent trends suggest
that future trade-related worker displacements
may come increasingly from the service sector,
the program should probably be expanded. There
have also been criticisms leveled at the operation
of the program based on its high rate of denial,
which stands at roughly a third of all applicants,
and its rather modest size when compared to the
volume of trade in which the U.S. is engaged
(Mastel, 2006). In 2004, for example, the federal
government allocated 1.3 billion dollars to the
program. Although large in an absolute sense,
this figure is small when compared to the $1.5
trillion of imports and $23.6 billion collected in
tariff revenue in that year.
In addition, as Chairman Bernanke noted in
remarks three years ago, the program is con-
founded by the difficulty of identifying workers
who have been displaced by trade as opposed to
some other reason (Bernanke, 2004). It is also
not clear why workers who have been displaced
by trade should receive greater assistance than
those who have been displaced by, say, techno-
logical change. Improving programs that help all
displaced workers move on to new jobs may
help to persuade Americans that free trade is
worthwhile.
I would also like to stress two other policies
that are crucial to the well-being of the American
labor force. First, economies must continue to
promote education at all levels, including expand-
ing opportunities for post-secondary education.
Not only are highly educated individuals better
prepared to succeed in an information technology
dominated workplace, they also experience lower
rates of job displacement, shorter durations of
unemployment and greater wage growth over
time (Bureau of Labor Statistics). Second, policy-
makers should continue to pursue macroeconomic
strategies that ensure full employment and price
stability. As my comments earlier have indicated,
for countries like the United States and the
United Kingdom, the employment situation is
largely determined by the state of the domestic
macroeconomy.
CONCLUSION
During the 1960s and 1970s, many develop-
ing nations feared that opening their economies
to trade with the more developed world would
make them worse off (Freeman, 1995). Yet, by
liberalizing their trade policies, many developing
economies, including South Korea, Taiwan and
China, have experienced long periods of rapid
economic growth (Krueger, 2004).
Within recent years, a significant anti-trade
sentiment seems to have emerged in the devel-
oped world. As policymakers, it is incumbent
upon us to maintain a commitment to free and
open trade, while helping those who experience
losses from it find new opportunities. In doing
so, we hope to ensure continued increases in our
standard of living and persuade greater numbers
of people that trade can be beneficial for everyone.
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